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In a recent article, Palmeri, Wong and Gauthier1 have argued that computational 
models may help direct hypotheses about the development of perceptual expertise. 
They support their claim by an analysis of models from the object-recognition and 
perceptual-categorization literatures. Surprisingly, however, they do not consider any 
computational models from traditional research into expertise, essentially the research 
deriving from Chase and Simon’s chunking theory2,3, which itself was influenced by 
De Groot’s study of chessplayers4. This is unfortunate, as a series of computational 
models based on perceptual chunking have explained a substantial number of 
phenomena related to expert behaviour and provide mechanisms that directly address 
the question of perceptual expertise. 
 
This neglect is perhaps due to the belief (p. 378) that “early expertise research focused 
on problem solving, decision making and reasoning. But recent years have seen 
growing interest in perceptual expertise […]”. This statement is simply incorrect. At 
least since De Groot’s thesis in 1946, and clearly since Chase and Simon’s 1973 
papers on perception and memory in chess, perceptual processes, and in particular 
pattern recognition, have played a key role in theories of expert behaviour. Chase and 
Simon proposed that expertise is made possible by the acquisition of a large number 
of perceptual chunks (groups of features made familiar through practice and that can 
be used as a unit), which become increasingly larger as skill develops. They supported 
their claim by a detailed analysis of the way chessplayers of various skill levels 
decompose a position into chunks, in both a perceptual task and a memory task. This 
work has led to a substantial interest in the role of perceptual expertise in domains 
including board games5,6, sports7,8, and medical diagnosis9.  
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Research into perceptual expertise has also led to a number of computational models 
of expert behaviour10,11, in particular with respect to chess expertise. While early work 
used information theory12, later work used mechanisms related to domain-specific 
heuristics for simulating eye movements13 and chunking mechanisms for simulating 
perception and memory14. A recent computational model, CHREST (Chunk 
Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures)15-21 has integrated these early models, providing 
an explanation of how pattern-recognition mechanisms develop to enable a rapid 
identification of external objects, how experts’ perceptual chunks help direct their eye 
movements, and how some chunks evolve into schemata that ground conceptual 
understanding into perceptual knowledge. Simulations from novices to grandmasters 
capture the details of data such as the duration and overall pattern of eye fixations; the 
number, size, and internal structure of the reconstructed chunks; the effect of various 
distortions on pattern recognition; and the overall improvement curve in memory 
experiments, both as a function of expertise and of presentation time. Contrasting with 
the models discussed by Palmeri et al., CHREST simulates the perceptual behaviour 
of top-level experts, and integrates perceptual expertise with memory, problem 
solving, and decision making. As reviewed in a recent TICS article20, the generality of 
chunking mechanisms is supported by their application to a number of domains, 
including verbal learning, letter perception, categorization, early acquisition of 
language, problem solving in physics, and the role of high-level information on 
perception. 
 
Most of the phenomena discussed by Palmeri et al. either relate to expertise that most 
people have (e.g., face expertise) or to the type of “expertise” acquired after a few 
hours of practice at most. By contrast, traditional research into expertise has studied 
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individuals that perform vastly better than the majority in their domain, typically after 
many years of practice and study. While we recognize this difference in emphasis, we 
strongly believe, as do Palmeri et al. (p. 378) that essentially the same mechanisms 
are used in all these domains. By showing how perceptual mechanisms underpin 
memory and problem solving processes, and backing up their claims by detailed 
simulations from novices to top-level experts, chunking models go beyond the models 
discussed by Palmeri et al., which are mostly limited to the (important) processes of 
identification, recognition and categorization. 
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